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USING THE LAW TO BREAK DISCRIMINATORY
BARRIERS TO FAIR LENDING FOR
HOME OWNERSHIP
DAVID

I.

H.

HARRIS, JR.*

INTRODUCrION.

Home ownership is the linchpin in the American Dream, the main
way families accumulate and hold wealth. Americans borrow against
their homes for education, for vacations, for emergencies, for retirement. The family home often forms the bulk of parents' bequests to
their children.'
For most persons, credit is necessary to own a home - or to
purchase a car, or to own or operate a business. Access to credit is
particularly essential for successful economic development activities
to improve economically distressed communities. At the heart of this
quest for economic well-being is the desire to own a home.
However, access to the credit necessary to purchase a home is severely restricted by the limited number and capacity of minorityowned/controlled lending institutions and the pervasive discriminatory practices by majority-owned/controlled banks and savings and
loans associations. Discrimination in mortgage lending is an essential
ingredient in the problem of housing discrimination and segregated
housing patterns.'
This article examines discriminatory lending practices and their impact on home ownership. In addition, this article will discuss legal
remedies and strategies available to individuals. For attorneys who
© 1995 Land Loss Prevention Project
* J.D., 1981, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author is Executive
Director of the Land Loss Prevention Project-a nonprofit, public interest law firm, located at

North Carolina Central University School of Law, created to address legal and economic
problems associated with the loss of small farmers and minority landowners. This article is a
continuing legal education manuscript presented at the American Bar Association Annual Convention on August 7,1994, in New Orleans, LA, during a seminar entitled Breaking BarriersTo
Fair Housing and FairLending-Involving the Private Bar.
1. Bill Dedman, The Color of Money (pt. 1), Tim ATLANTA JoURNAL-CoNsTrUTION,

May 1, 1988, at 6.
2. For more information on segregated housing patterns, see ROBERT D. BuAm ET AL.,
RrsmamrAL APAnr imn: TnE AMERICA LEGACY (1994); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTnEI:
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(1993).
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represent financial institutions, suggestions on how to eliminate discrimination at client institutions will also be addressed.

Discrimination by governmental agencies, such as the Farmers

Home Administration, 3 and discrimination in lending to minorityowned businesses, while also problematic, will not be discussed.4 This
article focuses on discrimination in housing lending by private financial institutions.
Also pervasive, but not to be discussed in this article, is discrimina-

tory practices by realtors in violation of the Fair Housing Act,5 homeowner insurance redlining, predatory practices by consumer finance
companies, and discriminatory practices by private mortgage insurance companies. An informative article on homeowner insurance redlining and discriminatory practices by private mortgage insurance
companies is cited in the footnote.6
I]. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM.
From the beginning, persons of color 7 have faced discrimination in
housing and lending. For example, since the days of Reconstruction,
the availability of affordable credit to raise crops, buy land, build a
home, purchase seed and fertilizer to raise crops and feed animals,
and acquire a business has eluded African-Americans. Historically,
majority-owned banking institutions have either refused to loan
money to Americans of African descent or loaned funds at very deleterious terms compared to their non-black customers - such as charg-

ing higher finance charges.8 Similar practices were perpetrated by
owners of farm supply stores and white landowners under so called
"sharecropping" arrangements. Given these and other practices, the

3. The Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), part of the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA), was a federal agency that provided, inter alia, loans and technical assistance to limited-resource and beginning farmers and housing loans to low to moderate income
rural residents. The farm loans programs of the Farmers Home Administration were consolidated into the Consolidated Farm Service Agency. Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-354, § 226, 108 Stat. 3178
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (1994)).
4. For information on these issues, contact the author (1-800-672-5839).
5. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1636 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619
(1988)).
6. Penny Loeb et al., The New Redlining: It's Different from the Old, But Minorities are
Still Getting Shortchanged, U.S. Naws & WoRLD REP. 51 (Apr. 17, 1995) [hereinafter The New
Redlining].
7. For purposes of this article, the terms "persons of color," "minority" and "minorities"
will refer to all noncaucasian ethnic groups, the members of which have been subjected to racial,
ethnic or cultural prejudice because of the identity of the persons as members of a group, without regard to the qualities of the members. These groups include African-Americans (blacks),
Native Americans, Alaskan Natives, Latinos, Asians, and/or Pacific Islanders.
8. See generally, U.S. COmm'N ON Civ. Ris., Tnm DncLINE OF BLACK FARMIN IN
AMERICA 14-43 (Feb. 1982) [hereinafter The Decline of Black Farming].
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progress blacks made towards landownership and economic self-determination by the early 20th Century, i.e., 15 million acres of land
owned by black farmers by 1910,9 925,710 black-owned or operated
farms by 1920,10 and 50 black-owned banks by 1911,11 is nothing short
of miraculous.
Despite the Civil Rights movement of the 1960's and the multitude
of anti-discrimination laws enacted during the 1960's and 1970's, discrimination in the availability and the terms and conditions of credit
has continued almost unabated. To add insult to injury, just as the
federal government has become more active in enforcing anti-credit
discrimination laws, there has been a concerted effort in Congress, fueled by the banking industry, to gut anti-credit discrimination laws
and obliterate the Justice Department's ability to file enforcement
2 actions against lending institutions that violate fair lending laws.1
Many studies and analyses of lending data confirm that banks and
thrifts continue to discriminate voraciously. For example, a 1988
study showed that whites received five times the number of loans from
banks and savings and loans in Atlanta as blacks with the same income.13 The same study concluded that "race - not home value or
household income - consistently determine[d] the lending patterns of
metro Atlanta's largest financial institutions."" This study of banks in
Atlanta suggested that majority-owned banks had declination rates the ratio of rejected loan applications - of blacks over whites of four
to one. "Even lower-income white neighborhoods received more of
their loans from banks than upper-middle-income black
neighborhoods."'1s
A recent study of 1992 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
data of North Carolina banks showed a uniformly higher declination
rate of blacks than whites in the metropolitan statistical areas surveyed. 16 These areas included Asheville, Fayetteville, Charlotte, Raleigh-Durham and Wilmington, among others. In 1991, NCNB's (now
NationsBank) average home mortgage rejection rate in North Caro9. THm BLACK LANDOWNER - ENDA
NOMIC IMPLICATIONS, at xvii (Leo McGee

rERED SPcins - SoCIAL, POLrICAL, AND Eco& Robert Boone eds., 1979).
10. The Decline of Black Farming,supra note 8, at 3.
11. Id. at 21.
12. See H.R. 1858, 104th Cong., Reg. Sess. (June 15, 1995); H.R. 1362, 104th Cong. Reg.
Sess. (Mar. 30, 1995); S. 650, 104th Cong., Reg. Sess. (Mar. 30, 1995); see also John Taylor, CRA
is Finally Working - But Congress Aims to Kill It, Reinvestment Works (National Community
Reinvestment Coalition Publication), Summer 1995 at 1.
13. Dedman, supra note 1, at 1.

14. Id.

15. Id. at 3.
16. Peter Skillem, An Analysis of 1992 Mortgage Lending Activity to African-American
and Low-Income Households in North Carolina Metropolitan Statistical Areas (May 10, 1994)

(Appendix A) (on file with the author).
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lina for upper income blacks was twelve percent higher than upper
income whites, for a 1.52 denial ratio of minorities to whites. A comparison of the ratios for loan denials for minorities versus whites in
some of the metropolitan areas studied revealed that denials for mi17
norities exceeded denials for whites by a range of 16 to 100 percent.
The 1992 HMDA data revealed that NationsBank had an average
black-to-white declination rate of 2.172, a rate higher than its predecessor in the previous year. Instead of exemplifying a reduction in
discrimination in lending, the data seems to show an increase in the
occurrences of disparate treatment.
In that same study, the performance of North Carolina financial institutions was ranked to generate a "report card" based on indicators
providing a composite score of lending patterns to low income and
minority households.' 8 Indicators included variables such as market
share by race; ratio of loans in high income census tracts to those
made in low income tracts; average loan size; and percentage of FHA/
VA/FmHA loans made. The overall statewide grade received for all
financial institutions was "C". Only three financial institutions received overall individual grades of "A" in metropolitan statistical areas. One of those institutions is the state's largest minority-controlled
financial institution, Mechanics and Farmers Bank. Of the fourteen
institutions studied, eight received a grade of "C" or below. This report card demonstrates the lack of actual, aggressive effort by banks
and financial institutions to eliminate the problem of illegal racial discrepancy in lending.
A 1992 magazine article reported on the findings of a study by the
Boston Federal Reserve demonstrating systematic racial discrimination in mortgage lending, even after taking into account applicants'
credit histories.: 9 The study focused on 131 financial institutions in
the Boston metropolitan area and found that even when two applicants were identical in every economic respect, including credit history, a minority applicant was sixty percent more likely to be rejected
than a white applicant. The study found that the system of discrimination engaged in by these institutions was not determined by the income of the applicant or by the size of the financial institution.20 The
results of this study sharply cut into the arguments by many bankers
that federal reports on discriminatory lending were not plausible because applicants' credit histories were not considered.
17. Id. at 2.
18. Id. at Appendix B (table ranking by letter grade the performance of fourteen North

Carolina financial institutions in metropolitan statistical areas).
19. Frank Shaforth, Cities and Banking: To Reinvest or Disinvest (pt 2), NATION'S CrrIEs
WKLY., Nov. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII File.

20. Id.
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A recently released study of 1993 mortgage lending activity involving African-American and low income households in the Durham/Raleigh, North Carolina Metropolitan Statistical Area examined the
mortgage lending performance of the region's eleven largest financial
institutions, the state's largest minority-controlled institution, and the
state's largest credit union.2 1 Analyzing HMDA data, the study reviewed factors such as the percent of portfolio lent to black and low
income groups, as well as comparing the rates of denials for black and
white applicants. The results of the study clearly indicated that the
lending patterns of many of North Carolina's most prominent institutions severely limit the ability of minority and low income borrowers
to purchase their own homes. The report clearly shows that race and
income continue to be major factors in determining whether institutions in North Carolina will approve home ownership loan
applications.22
In late 1994, U.S. News & World Report began a six-month investigation into banking, lending and home insurance coverage in poor and
minority communities.2 1 The study included data from 200 interviews
conducted in twelve cities across the nation and nine sets of banking
and insurance industry data, including more than twenty-four million
mortgage records. The study found that the number of poor and
minority homeowners who could not obtain full-coverage property
insurance was nearly fifty percent greater than residents of predominately white, middle class areas. The study found banks were fleeing
poor neighborhoods in even greater numbers than before, irrespective
of federal laws prohibiting such action. In examining data from the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 24 U.S. News & World Report
discovered that in 31 percent of the nation's urban areas, the number
of bank branches in white neighborhoods has tripled in the past two
decades compared with the number of branches in mostly minority
neighborhoods. According to this study, there are an average of
thirty-eight bank branches per 100,000 residents in white areas, but
only twenty-two branches per 100,000 residents in minority neighborhoods. For middle income blacks living in predominately minority areas, the rejection rate for mortgage loans was 37 percent while the
rejection rate for middle income whites living in predominately white
areas was 18 percent. Overall, residents of middle income white
neighborhoods received 61 percent more mortgage loans than resi21. Peter Skillern, An Analysis of 1993 Mortgage Lending Activity to African-American
and Low-Income Households in Durham/Raleigh, North Carolina Metropolitan Statistical Area
(June 5, 1995) (Unpublished report, on file with the author).
22. Id.
23. The New Redlining, supra note 6, at 51.
24. See infra note 38.
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dents of middle income minority areas. The study listed larger cities
with significant minority populations that had the greatest disparity
between bank branches and conventional home loans in white and
minority areas.'
"Redlining" is one practice that banks and thrifts use to deny loans
to minority persons and businesses. "Redlining is [the] ... practice of

refusing to lend in certain neighborhoods on the basis of race, ethnic
composition: or any standards other than creditworthiness. The definition comes from the practice of drawing a red line on a map around
certain neighborhoods to designate them as off-limits.' ' 6 Despite the
enactment of the Fair Housing Act, the Community Reinvestment
Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, redlining continues, according to some bank officials who
have admitted privately that they refuse to loan money to persons living in or near property located in certain zip codes. 2 7 As is evident
from the U.S. News & World Report study and report, "insurance redlining" has become common practice,28 further thwarting the American Dream of home ownership for many persons of color.
Credit discrimination takes other forms: the closing of branch offices in areas that become inhabited by minority or low income persons 2 9 the refusal to open branches in black communities, including
middle income black communities; requiring high minimum balances
to open accounts; refusal to cash checks for non-depositors, even government checks held by persons with the proper identification; the
general refusal to seek minority clients or businesses; the increasing
refusal to make small loans to small businesses; and, the increasing
refusal to make loans to small farm operators. 30
Although many reasons are given, the refusal to make mortgage
loans to minorities is inexcusable. The Atlanta study showed that one
black-owned bank, Citizens Trust, a bank making the bulk of the
mortgage loans to blacks, had a lower default rate than the six largest
banks in Atlanta.3
The impact of discriminatory credit practices is devastating upon
communities of color. Few immigrants came to this nation with more
than the shirts on their backs, and the slaves who arrived had even
less. However, all immigrants, voluntary or involuntary, learned of
the American Dream - the hope that "with hard work and persever25. Id. at 52.
26. Dedman, supra note 1, at 2.
27. Id. at 10.

28.
29.
30.
31.

The New Redlining, supra note 6, at 52.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ance, wealth and the ability to feed your family and to fully participate
in the democratic process in the community can be yours." Discrimination in credit prevents attainment of this Dream.
The Atlanta Constitution article stated the dilemma best: "Without
equal access to credit.., neighborhoods slide. When people cannot
borrow money to buy or fix up houses, property values decline. Real
estate agents direct their best prospects elsewhere. Appraisers hedge
their bets by undervaluing property. Businesses close. Homeowners
sell to speculators."32 Credit discrimination is the first ingredient in
the recipe for black land loss.
The cycle of poverty that permeates communities of color is also a
result of this problem. Job discrimination prevents many persons of
color from earning the income necessary to feed and educate their
families. Credit discrimination prevents the creation and growth of
minority-owned businesses that provide jobs in minority communities
and increase the overall wealth of minority communities through the
multiplier effect.
Housing patterns created by discriminatory housing and lending
practices contribute to the problem of environmental racism. Discrimination in housing and housing lending limits the choices persons
of color have of where they can live, creating segregated housing patterns that have been nearly impossible to break. A black person who
makes $50,000 per year has fewer choices in where he or she can live
and thus is more segregated than an Hispanic person making $2,500. 33
Race, not class, is the dominant determinant of where blacks are allowed to live.34 Many middle class African-Americans attempting to
"escape" the inner city find themselves "re-segregated into what sociologists call the 'inner ring' or 'near-in suburbs,' such as Prince
George's County or Silver Spring, in Maryland, which surround Washington, D.C.135 The net result is that both middle and working class

blacks lack freedom of movement and end up living in defined pockets not unlike the black townships of South Africa.
Once "stuck," African-Americans and other people of color find
their neighborhoods become the easy, preferable targets for hazardous waste dump sites, solid waste landfills, facilities that discharge pollutants into the air and water, and other noxious facilities. Wastemanagement firms find it politically expedient and economically pref32. Dedman, supra note 1, at 6 (pt 1).
33. Scott Minerbrook, Home Ownership Anchors The Middle Class- But Lending Games
Sink Many Prospective Owners, EMERGE MAG. 42,44 (Oct. 1993), discussing DouGLAs S. MASsEY & NANCY A. DENToN, AimUcAN AARTHmn: SEREGAnTON AND THE MAXING OF ThE
UNDERCLASS (1993).

34. Id.
35. Id.
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erable to site facilities in minority communities. A polluter will, like
most things, travel the course of least resistance. Those who live in
white neighborhoods, especially middle and upper income neighborhoods, have the economic resources and political clout to fight off a
toxic facility planning to move into their areas. Majority white city
councils enact ordinances that protect white neighborhoods, but not
black neighborhoods, from noxious facilities. When all else fails, the
white residents can "vote with their feet" and exodus the area.
The residents of African-American communities, on the other hand,
lack the income and the political power or will to keep polluting industries from moving into their neighborhoods.
Racial and ethnic communities have been and continue to be beset
by poverty, unemployment and problems related to poor housing, education and health. These communities cannot afford the luxury of
being primarily concerned about the quality of their environment
when confronted by a plethora of pressing problems related to their
day-to-day survival.3 6
Key factors in the siting of poisonous polluting facilities in communities of color are poverty and the lack of real community economic
development activities in minority and economically distressed communities. Within this context [of discrimination and poverty], racial
and ethnic communities become particularly vulnerable to those who
advocate the siting of a hazardous waste facility as an avenue for employment and economic development. Thus, proposals that economic
incentives be offered to mitigate local opposition to the establishment
of new hazardous waste facilities raise disturbing social policy
questions. 37
Consequently, as discrimination in housing and lending continue,
and as policymakers continue their failure to develop sustainable solutions to poverty in minority and low income communities, including
rural areas, these communities become prime targets of polluters. The
residents lack the political power or will to fight off these polluters
and to "fight city hall." Also, local residents and policymakers are
tricked into embracing these polluters by the promise of job creation.
Even if they had the income, housing discrimination limits the ability of persons of color to "vote with their feet" and escape polluting
facilities. Middle class blacks are also victims of housing discrimination and their neighborhoods are not immune from the nearby siting
of a polluting facility.
36. Benjamin A. Goldman & Laura Fitton, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States, A
NationalReport on the Racialand Social Economic Characteristicsof Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites 7, 8 (Commission for Racial Justice 1987) [hereinafter Toxic Wastes].
37. Id. at 8.
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In sum, many of the problems that plague poor and inner-city communities and communities of color can be traced to economic discrimination as well as political discrimination. Discrimination in the
availability, terms and conditions of credit is part of this economic discrimination. It is necessary for the survival and advancement of communities of color that the problem of credit discrimination be
eliminated.
For a long time, bank regulators 38 tried to pretend that discrimination in banking did not exist. However, this trend
is changing, starting
39
with the Decatur Federal Savings & Loan case.
III. CONGRESsIoNAL RBSPONSE.
The first major congressional response to discriminatory lending
practices occurred in the mid-1970's when it passed the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act and the Community Reinvestment Act. This legislation, however, was preceded by the Fair Housing Act of 1968.
A.

Equal Credit Opportunity Act

Congress first enacted Title VII of the Consumer Protection Act of
1974, known as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), to prohibit credit discrimination against women. Congress amended the
ECOA in 1976 to also prohibit credit discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, and age. The ECOA, as
amended, provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to
contract);
38. Banking regulators are federal and state bodies that examine and supervise banking

institutions for financially sound risk management based on the individual bank's charter. The
regulator's role is to ensure the bank or financial institution is operating in accordance with
government regulations, which include safe financial management with adequate capital, nondiscriminatory lending practices, and productive community investment. There are four federal
regulators: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of Thrift Supervision. In each state, there are
state regulators that supervise that state's banks in accordance with the individual charters. The
federal regulators do not supervise the state regulators but may supervise the same banks. 12
C.F.R. § 228A(a), (b), (e) (1995). See also Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC), A Citizen's Guide to the CRA 8 (June 1992) [hereinafter referred to as "FFIEC
Guide"].
39. United States v. Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. 92-CV-2198 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 17,
1992) (Complaint and Consent Decree). See also United States v. Shawmut Mortgage Co., No.
3:93CV2453 (AVC) (D. Conn. Dec. 13, 1993) (Complaint and Consent Decree) (on file with the
author).
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(2) because all or part of the applicant's income derives from any
public assistance program; or
(3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right
under this chapter [the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 16011.
Regulation B implements the ECOA and defines a creditor as "a
person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly participates
in the decision of whether or not to extend credit."'" The ECOA further defines a creditor as "any person who regularly extends, renews,
or continues credit."'4 2 The ECOA defines credit as "the right granted
by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debts
and defer its payment .... ."43
Regulation B and the ECOA define person as "a natural person,
corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency,
trust, estate, partnership, cooperative or association." 44 An applicant
is defined as "any person who applies to a creditor directly for an
extension, renewal, or continuation of credit ... ."I The ECOA,
therefore, clearly applies to an individual's attempt to obtain credit
from a bank to buy or improve a home.
The scope of Regulation B and the ECOA is very broad, protecting
applicants in every aspect of a credit transaction, from the initial
credit inquiry or request through final payment of the credit, including
collections activity. The ECOA governs situations where a lender denies credit or where existing credit is terminated, or where other adverse changes occur. Regulation B defines the credit transaction as
"every aspect of an applicant's dealings with a creditor regarding an
application for credit or an existing extension of credit (including, but
not limited to, information requirements; investigation procedures;
standards of creditworthiness; terms of credit; furnishing of credit information; revocation, alteration or termination of credit; and collection procedures)." 46
The ECOA was recently amended to require the creditor to provide
a copy of the real estate appraisal report relied upon for any loan
secured by residential real property if requested by the borrower or
applicant in writing. 47 This amendment responds to congressional
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1988).
41. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(1) (1995).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(e) (1988).

43. Id. at § 1691a(d).
44. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(x) (1995); 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(f) (1988).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (1988).
46. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(m) (1995).
47. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242,
105 Stat. 2236 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e) (Supp. III 1991)).

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol22/iss2/2
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concern about indirect discriminatory lending practices through the
use of biased appraisal reports.
B.

Community Reinvestment Act

Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977
(CRA) 48 as an additional tool for overcoming obstacles in obtaining
credit. Despite the adoption of the ECOA and the Fair Housing Act,
many persons of color and low income persons continued to face discriminatory lending practices. The CRA has become an effective tool
for community groups seeking fair lending and community development by permitting community groups to protest banks' lending
records and win agreements for more loans.49
The CRA, unlike other legislation, does not impose substantive restrictions on lending institutions. Rather, it emphasizes the continuing
and affirmative responsibility of financial institutions to serve or meet
the credit needs of the entire communities in which they are chartered
to serve.50 All federally insured commercial banks, savings banks, and
savings associations that offer or provide credit to the public are governed by the CRA.51 Credit unions are the only federally insured financial institutions not covered by the CRA.
The CRA also imposes requirements on the regulators. Federal examiners must periodically examine every bank for compliance with
the CRA. The exam results are published in the CRA Performance
Evaluation, which the bank must make available to the public. The
regulators must also take a bank's CRA performance into consideration when evaluating federal deposit insurance, branching, merger or
acquisition, or holding company applications. A bank's merger application could be denied based on poor CRA performance. It is this
fact, and the ability to comment on proposed changes, that give community groups leverage in forcing banks to enter into CRA agreements to improve lending, including housing lending. "For more than
15 years, CRA lending has been profitable and safe lending for banks.
More important, CRA has benefitted low-, moderate- and middle-income Americans of all races by fostering home ownership and creating small businesses. All at no cost to taxpayers. "52
48. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1988).
49. The New Redlining, supra note 6, at 51.
50. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a) (1988).

51. Id.at §2902.
52. Ames Alexander, Banks: Bridge or Barrierto Home Ownership?, Tsn CHARuoTrE
OBSERVER (July 10, 1995), at Al (quoting Irving Henderson, President of the Community Reinvestment Association of North Carolina and Board Chairman of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition).
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C.

Home Mortgage Disclosure Act

Originally enacted in 1975, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA),53 ,was Congress' response to concerns about credit
shortages in urban neighborhoods, particularly low and moderate income neighborhoods. The primary purpose of the HMDA is to provide both the regulatory agencies and the public with important data
from which it may be determined whether, and to what extent, financial institutions are meeting the credit needs of their communities.
The HMDA is a disclosure law that assists financial institutions and
regulators in monitoring compliance with the CRA and other fair
lending laws. Regulation C implements the HMDA.5 4
Pursuant to the HMDA, covered institutions must report data regarding loan applications, originations, and purchases. In addition to
reporting data on the location of the property and the amount of the
loan, the HMDA requires lenders to report the race, sex, and income
of the applicants. All financial institutions must collect and report
HMDA data on mortgage lending and loan applications unless exempt because of size or location.5 5 An institution is exempt from all
of the requirements of the HMDA for a given year if it meets any one
of the following criteria:
1. It had less than $10 million in assets as of the end of the previous
calendar year;
2. It does not have an office or branch located in a Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA); or
3. It is state-chartered and subject to a substantially similar state law
56
and has received an exemption from the Federal Reserve Board
Non-depository, for-profit mortgage lenders are also covered by the
HMDA and Regulation C unless:
1. The lender had neither a home nor branch office in an MSA; or
2. The lender's total assets combined with those of any parent corporation were $10 million or less on the preceding December 31, and
the lender originated fewer
57 than 100 home purchase loans in the
preceding calendar year.
For-profit mortgage lenders are considered to have an office in an
MSA if they meet at least one of the following criteria:
1. Have a physical office that takes or receives applications from the
public in an MSA; or
53. Pub. L. No. 94-200, title III, 89 Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-

2811 (1975)).
54. 12 C.F.R. §§ 203.1-203.6 (1994).

55. Id. at § 203.4.
56. Id. at § 203.3.
57. Id. at § 203.3(a)(2).
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2. Received applications for originating or purchasing at least five
home purchase or home improvement 58
loans on property in an
MSA during the previous calendar year.
Loans and applications for loans of the following types are reportable under IMDA: home purchase loans; home improvement loans
(whether secured or unsecured); home equity lines of credit (if the
applicant indicates that the funds will be used for home improvement
and is carried on the lender's books as a home improvement loan);
and refinancing of the above.59
Lenders must record the required data on loan/application registers
(LARs). Covered lenders must make their LARs available to the
public after removing identifying information. 60 Each year, the Federal Reserve will prepare a mortgage loan disclosure statement for
each reporting institution and send it to the respective institutions.
The lender must make the statement available to the public for five
years and have it available at its home office and at least one branch
or office in each MSA.61 Lenders must also display a sign or notice
indicating the availability of the statement in each branch located in
an MSA.62
The HMDA has become increasingly important in the last few
years, particularly as a mechanism for improving Congress' ability to
oversee fair lending enforcement activity by the regulators. Regulators rely heavily on HMDA data to target banks whose mortgage
lending patterns suggest racial bias. Therefore, it is extremely important for applicants to provide accurate and complete information.
Given the history of racism and discrimination in our society, minorities are often reluctant to provide race information on their applications. Thus, all applicants for home loans, and especially minorities,
must be encouraged to provide monitoring data (race, sex, and income) to the government.
D. The FairHousing Act
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) was enacted as Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968.63 The FlA committed the federal government to
the goals of open housing. The FHA, as amended, prohibits discrimination in all phases of housing sales, financing, or rental on the basis
of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, handicap, or familial sta58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

§ 203.2(c)(2).
§ 203.4.
§ 203.5(c).
§ 203.5(b).
§ 203.5(e).

63. Pub. L No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1636 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619

(1988)).
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tus.64 The credit provisions of the FHA cover all mortgage and home
improvement loans and all housing lenders.65 The following lending
practices have been or likely would be found to violate the FHA: (1)
redlining; (2) using excessively low appraisals; (3) using arbitrary or
subjective criteria to justify a decision actually made on a prohibited
basis; (4) creating a racially exclusive image by using advertising depicting persons of only one race, implying that members of other
groups are not welcome; (5) discouraging applications; (6) setting excessively burdensome qualification standards; (7) imposing more onerous terms or conditions on members of one group and not another
on a prohibited basis; (8) using terms or availability of insurance to
deny credit; (9) racial steering; and (10) minimum mortgage loan
amounts that exceed purchase price of housing stock in certain
66
areas.

Both the Federal Reserve Board and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) have issued companion orders and
rules, respectively, which require lenders to display the equal housing
lender logo or statement in all advertisements for home purchase,
construction, improvement, repair, or maintenance loans, and to ensure that all media advertisement is free of bias and discriminatory
images. 67
E. Recent Fair Lending Developments.
1. Increased Regulatory Activities.
Fair lending enforcement has become the top enforcement priority
and policy concern for the four primary financial institution regulators. On May 27, 1993, a joint letter, signed by the heads of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), was sent to the chief executive
officer of every bank and thrift in the country, expressing the agencies'
expectations that all financial institutions do their part to ensure that
lending take place on a non-discriminatory basis. The letter stated in
relevant part:
The federal financial institutions supervisory agencies are deeply
concerned that some minority consumers and small business owners
may be experiencing discriminatory treatment in their efforts to ob64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605 (1988) (emphasis added).
65. Id. at § 3605(a), (b).
66. Id. at § 3605; Federal Reserve Regulatory Service (FRRS) 6-1483 through 6-1492
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1994).
67. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Board Order on Fair Housing
Advertising and Poster Requirements (Mar. 21, 1989); 24 C.F.R. §§ 109.5-109.30 (1993) (HUD
regulations).
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tain credit from financial institutions. Discrimination in lending, on
any prohibited basis, strikes at the fabric of both our political commitment to equal opportunity and our economic commitment to free and
competitive markets.
Our agencies are committed to making sure that financial institutions understand their fair lending obligations and respond
appropriately.
It is clear to the agencies that more needs to be done to assure equal
access to credit by everyone in our country. We expect all financial
institutions to participate in this effort.68

HUD and the federal regulators also issued a joint policy statement
on discrimination in lending to provide, in part, "guidanceabout what
the agencies
consider in determining if lending discrimination exists." 69 This statement describes how evidence of disparate impact
70
will be used as evidence of lending discrimination.

The OCC and the FDIC have taken significant steps in implementing the highly touted new enforcement efforts by radically modifying
exam procedures. Unlike the former exam procedures, the new fair
lending exam guidelines are much more likely to detect and ferret out
discriminatory lending practices, both intentional and unintentional.
Several banks have and will be undergoing the new exam over the
next few months. Decatur Federal Savings and Loan did not long
hold the dubious distinction of being the only financial institution to
have been held to have a "pattern or practice" of discrimination.7 1

Other enforcement actions have been filed by the Justice Department
with consent decrees.72
68. Letter From The Federal Reserve Board, The Comptroller of the Currency, The Office
of Thrift Supervision and The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to all Banks and Thrifts
(May 27, 1993) (on file with the agencies and the author) (reprinted in 1993 WL 196079
(O.C.C.)).
69. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Housing Finance
Board (FHFB), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending (Apr.
15, 1994) [hereinafter cited as Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending], reprinted in
FRRS 6-153.11 through 6-153.29.
70. FRRS 6-153.16.
71. Decatur Federal Savings and Loan ("Decatur") was the defendant in the first pattern or
practice lawsuit brought by the government against a mortgage lender. The Justice Department's complaint alleged numerous violations of the ECOA and the FHA.Decatur entered into
a consent decree on September 17, 1992. The consent decree is in effect for three years. United
States v. Decatur Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, No. 92-CV-2198 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 1992) (Complaint and Consent Decree).
72. See United States v. Shawmut Mortgage Co., No. 3:93CV2453 (AVC) (D. Conn. Dec.
13, 1993) (Complaint and Consent Decree) (on file with the author).
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2.

CRA Regulatory Reform.

a. Archaic/Ineffective Requirements.
The CRA requires a covered financial institution to meet the credit
needs of its entire community, including low to moderate income residents. It also imposes several technical requirements upon covered
institutions. For many years, the technical requirements for banks to
comply with the CRA have included:
(1) Annual adoption of a CRA statement for each delineated community served by the bank. The CRA statement must include a map
of the delineated area, a list of the types of credit products offered
in the community, and a CRA notice advising the public on how
to comment on the bank's CRA performance. The CRA statement must be readily available for the public to review, on request, "at the head office of the bank and at each office of the
bank in the local community delineated in the Statement." 73
(2) Maintenance of a CRA Public File, containing written comments
from the public regarding the bank's CRA performance and a
copy of the public section of the bank's most recent CRA Performance Evaluation prepared by the appropriate federal
regulator.74
(3) Posting or displaying a public CRA Notice in the public lobby of
its main office and each of its branches. The Notice must contain
the following information:
a. Where the public may obtain copies of the CRA Statement.
b. Where, and to whom, the public should address its comments
about the bank's CRA performance.
c. Where to inspect or obtain copies of the public file.
d. A statement that the CRA Performance Evaluation is available
for public inspection and where it is located.
e. The name of the bank's holding company, if there is one.
f. A statement on how to obtain announcements from the bank's
regulator of applications fied by the bank that may have CRA
considerations (federal deposit insurance, branching, merger or
acquisition, or holding company applications).75
The technical requirements and. the general regulatory scheme of
the CRA have been criticized by banks and community reinvestment
advocates alike. The banks complained that the technical requirements placed a tremendous paperwork burden on the banks. The
community advocates complained that the technical requirements did
not operate to improve performance and allowed banks with horrible
73. FFIEC Guide.

74. 12 C.F.R. § 228.5 (1995); FFIEC Guide at 8.
75. 12 C.F.R. § 228.6 (1995); FFIEC Guide at 9.
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lending practices to obtain
favorable CRA ratings. The arguments of
76
both sides have merit.
During the first six months of 1993, approximately 93 percent of all
institutions examined for CRA compliance received a satisfactory or
better rating.77 High ratings given to so many banks resulted in
charges of grade inflation and less than sincere enforcement by the
regulators. Over the first eleven months of 1994, the average rate of
those institutions receiving a satisfactory rating for CRA compliance
was 73.3 percent. The percentage of institutions receiving a rating of
needing improvement was 7.9 percent.78 The new regulations may address this problem; however, there is a pervasive effort to weaken or
derail these new regulations. Some members of Congress are working
very hard to enervate the CRA.79
b. 1993 Public Hearings.
In late 1993, the heads of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Reserve System, and the Office of Thrift Supervision
conducted a series of field hearings on community lending by financial
institutions. These hearings were held in compliance with a mandate
issued by President Clinton on July 15, 1993, in which he asked the
federal financial supervisory agencies to work together and consult
with the public, community groups, and the banking and thrift industries in reviewing and revising regulations to make the CRA more
effective.
These public hearings highlighted the dissatisfaction of the banking
industry and community groups with existing CRA evaluation process
in two respects: (1) the existing system was process-based, not performance-based; and (2) examiners were given too much discretion in
the evaluation process.
c. FirstSet of ProposedNew Regulations.
After conducting these hearings, the federal financial supervisory
agencies issued proposed regulations in December 1993 which consti76. The New Redlining, supra note 6, at 56.
77. Am. BANKER, 18 (July 20, 1994).
78. Summarized analysis of information provided in the 1994 monthly OTS NEWS RELEASE of NATIONAL CRA RATINGS by the Office Of Thrift Supervision, are available in
WESTLAW, FFIN-NR Library, at 1994 WL 81215 (O.T.S.), 1994 WL 230192 (O.T.S.), 1994 WL
183273 (O.T.S.), 1994 WL 246835 (O.T.S.), 1994 WL 361692 (O.T.S.), 1994 WL 399797 (O.T.S.),
1994 WL 50357 (O.T.S.), 1994 WL 509866 (O.T.S.), 1994 WL 570036 (O.T.S.), 1994 WL 658143
(O.T.S.), 1994 WL 707542 (O.T.S.).
79. House Bill H.R. 1362 and Senate Bill S. 650.
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tuted a total rewrite of CRA requirements.8 0 Some of the proposed
changes included:
(1) the replacement of the twelve factors being used to assess an institution's CRA performance with three tests based on lending, service, and investment performance in low and moderate income
areas; households;
(2) the option to submit a strategic plan that included measurable
goals for meeting CRA obligations as an alternative to undergoing
the three tests;
(3) the improvement of the enforcement capacity of the supervisory
agencies under the CRA by imposing sanctions, including civil
monetary penalties, and issuing cease and desist orders against
lenders found to be in substantial noncompliance with the law;
(4) expanded public disclosure of lending performance data by each
financial institutions; and
(5) advance notification of CRA examinations which would enable
community groups to provide examiners with
81 meaningful information regarding lenders' CRA performance.
The proposed regulations required additional data reporting for
consumer, small business, and home mortgage loans, with provisions
for disclosing that information to the public in a timely manner.
To provide incentives for strong performance, the proposed regulations clarified the way in which CRA performance would be considered in the application process. However, the regulations did not
contain a "safe harbor" provision.82 Under the assessment system,
further incentives would be provided to institutions that showed
strong performance by reducing the frequency of examinations. Finally, the proposed regulations would provide a different evaluation
framework for small institutions. s3
The proposed regulations promote performance-based CRA capture ratio, or the market share test.81 The market share test is based
on standards that measure relative market capture rates assessments
of lending practices by comparing an institution's market share of
loans in low- and moderate-income geographies to its share of loans in
its entire service area. s5
80. 58 Fed. Reg. 67466 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 228, 345, 563e) (proposed Dec.
21,1993).
81. Id.
82. A "safe harbor" provision would prevent community groups from challenging a merger
or other change if a bank received a high CRA rating.
83. 58 Fed. Reg. 67466, 67472.
84. Id. at 67468.
85. The New Redlining, supra note 6, at 58.
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This "first round" of proposed regulations met with a firestorm of
protests from the banking community,86 and opposition from even the
Federal Reserve Board.87 One major criticism to the CRA proposals
was the lack of sufficient inclusion of community input and participation.' Another major criticism related to the provision allowing alternative assessment methods for small banks with assets under $250
million. Banks in this category comprise nearly three-fourths of all
banks. Since the activities of these banks have a substantial impact on
the ability to obtain credit, especially in rural areas, critics opined that
the final CRA rules should eliminate the alternative assessment option for small banks and require that all regulated financial institutions be evaluated on the same criteria. Critics blasted the failure to
require full disclosure of data for non-MSA areas and the failure to
give sufficient weight to the lending test in determining compliance for
retail banks.
Also identified as critical issues were the lack of sufficient incentives
for banks to engage in community development lending, the lack of a
clear and objective definition of the market share concept, and the
lack of sufficient protections for consumers under the service test. Additionally, the lack of full regulation of the non-bank financial institutions, including finance companies, insurance companies, securities
brokers, and mutual funds was denounced for not addressing the realities of the 21st century credit market and leaving the door open for
discrimination to many low-income and minority communities where
only twenty-four percent of all loans in 1993 were issued from traditional banks. Finally, critics found the definition of small farms as
"private organizations... with average annual gross receipts of less
than $500,000 for the calendar or fiscal year preceding the making of
the loan,"8 9 as overly broad.
d. Second Set of ProposedNew Regulations.
In response to this public and private outcry against the first proposed CRA revision, the federal financial supervisory agencies pro86. See James Brosnan, New Urban Loan Rules Meet Ire of Bankers, Tim WASH. APPEAL,
Sunday, Mar. 27, 1994, at Al; Dee Depass, Constant Comment Revised CRA Gets Feedback,
Criticismfor Community Activists and Banks, STAR TimuNum (MS), Mar. 18, 1994, at OlD;
David Algeo, Banks Say New Reinvestment Rules Too Vague, THm WicmTrA EAGLE, Feb. 21,
1994, at 90; Jim King, A Banking No Show a Hit at CRA Meeting, THE ATLANTA CON T., Sept.
3, 1993, at D2.
87. Reform Agency Drops ControversialMarket Share Test, HousrON POST, Mar. 22,1994,
at E14.
88. Having testified at one of the public hearings, and seeing the diversity of the interests
represented by those who testified, the author has difficulty with this argument.
89. See 58 Fed. Reg. 67466, 67480 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 25.5(n)) (proposed Dec. 21,
1993).
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posed an entirely new set of proposed CRA regulations in the fall of
1994.90 This second set of proposed regulations was substantially
weaker than the original proposal, and fell far short of the President's
goal of an objective and performance-based CRA.
The proposed regulations identified seven major areas that needed
to be changed. First, a bank's record of lending to minority communities and individuals, as well as women- and minority-owned businesses, must be examined and evaluated under the lending test.
Second, the final regulations must include the full disclosure of small
business lending data by census tract (and small farm data by the
smallest practical unit), and the category of minority should be broken
down into distinct racial and ethnic categories (as used in the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act). Third, direct lending to local communities
by lenders, rather than loans to third parties and intermediaries, must
be made the primary focus of the lending test. Fourth, ATMs and
cash machines, while important, should not be considered as
equivalent to full service branches when assessing a lender's record of
providing banking services to low and moderate-income neighborhoods. Fifth, the lending test indicators in the regulation should include more objective performance goals and standards, including
ratios and benchmarks. Sixth, enforcement sanctions, such as cease
and desist orders and civil money penalties, must be used by the agencies against banks with below satisfactory CRA ratings. Seventh,
small banks with assets under $250 million should not face a weaker
form of CRA evaluation.
e. FinalRevised CRA Regulations.
Collectively, the Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC and OTS received

over 7,200 written comments on the 1994 proposal. As a result, in

1995, the Federal Reserve released new and final CRA regulations. 9 1
The new regulations retained the principles underlying the 1993 and
1994 proposals, but made changes in several important areas of these
earlier proposals. Some of the changes included:
(1) Asection included in the 1994 proposal that required banks and
thrifts to report small business lending by the race and gender of the
business was removed. However, the federal agencies announced
their intention to amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act regulations to allow banks to voluntarily report the information.
90. 59 Fed. Reg. 51232 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 25,228,345, 563e) (proposed Oct. 7,

1994).
91. 60 Fed. Reg. 22156, 22158 (1995) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 203, 228, 345,

563e).
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(2) The final rules do not require that lenders be primarily assessed
on their direct lending. The examiner has the discretion to decide the
appropriate weight between direct and indirect lending.
(3) The asset threshold for eligibility for the "streamlined" small
bank CRA evaluation is affiliates of bank holding companies with $1
billion or less in total assets. The affiliates must still be under $250
million in assets.
(4) Under the first two proposals, banks with a rating of "substantial noncompliance" under the CRA ratings would have been subject
to full enforcement powers of agencies (e.g., civil money penalties or
cease and desist orders). The agencies dropped this provision from
the final rule, basing their action on an opinion letter by the Justice
Department which maintained the agencies did not have the authority
to enforce under the CRA statute.
(5) Under the 1994 proposal, the affiliates of lenders would have
been assessed on their CRA performance if an agency determined
that the activity of the affiliate was integral to an institution's business.
This provision was weakened under the final rules. Affiliate lending
will only be considered at a lender's option.
(6) The final rules eliminated an earlier provision that would have
required the agencies to develop a formal credit needs analysis for
each service area as part of the "assessment context." The agencies
will now determine the credit needs by analyzing information an institution maintains on its community as well as information obtained
from community, government, civic, and other sources. Lenders will
not be required to ascertain community credit needs or conduct a
credit needs analysis apart from their normal business plans.
(7) The agencies will not treat ATMs the same as branches. Lenders will only be evaluated on the specific types of consumer lending
they choose to report. The agencies, however, will evaluate all consumer lending if a "substantial majority" of the institution's lending is
in consumer credit. Lenders will not be required to report this data,
requiring examiners to analyze a portion of the loan portfolio.
(8) The agencies have substantially changed the definition of community development lending and investments. "Community development" as defined means: (1) affordable housing (including multifamily rental housing) for low or moderate income individuals; (2)
community services targeted to low or moderate income individuals;
(3) activities that promote economic development by financing businesses or farmers with gross annual revenues of $1 million or less; and/
or (4) activities that revitalize or stabilize low or moderate income
geographies.
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(9) The final rules replace the term "service area" with "assessment
area." Assessment area represents the community within which the
agencies assess an institution's record of CRA performance. The regulators will not look at the capacity and constraints of the institution
in its business decision. An institution is not required to lend to all
census tracts or block numbers in its service area in meeting its CRA
obligations. The final rule retains the requirement that an assessment
area must not be arbitrary or exclude low or moderate income
variables.
(10) The final rule keeps the overall rating system for a financial
institution: "outstanding", "satisfactory," "need to improve," or "substantial noncompliance." All institutions will rated by three tests:
lending, service, and investment. For each test a financial institution
will receive one of five ratings: outstanding, high satisfactory, low satisfactory, needs to improve, substantial noncompliance. Institutions
receiving less than a "low satisfactory" on the lending test will be unable to achieve a satisfactory or better rating on its overall CRA rating. The agencies removed from the 1994 proposal the requirement
that an institution's CRA rating be downgraded automatically from
"needs to improve" to "substantial noncompliance" if it received no
better than a "needs to improve" rating on each of its two previous
examinations.
(11) The strategic plan for the final rules is basically the same as the
1994 proposal. Financial institutions can adopt this alternative. It requires the institution to seek suggestions and publish a notice of the
plan and solicit written public comment while developing the plan.
The agencies will rate an institution's performance under an approved
plan solely in relation to the goals set out in the plan.
Although there are still some problems with the new rules, they are
a step in the right direction. However, the new rules are already
under attack. During the 1995 session of Congress, Representative
Bill McCollum (R-FL) introduced H.R. 317, "the Community Reinvestment Improvement Act of 1995." This legislation would provide a
"safe harbor" to lenders with a satisfactory or better CRA rating
against protests of CRA applications, exempt banks under $100 million in assets and in towns under 25,000 in population, and provide a
weaker examination process for most banks under $500 million in assets. This bill was referred to the House Committee on Banking and
Financial Services.
The two most dangerous efforts underway in Congress to diminish
the CRA's effectiveness are House Bill 1362 and Senate Bill 650.
H.R. 1362 and S. 650 contain a number of anti-consumer and antineighborhood provisions. Both bills would exempt small banks from
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol22/iss2/2
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CRA coverage. Rural communities would be especially harmed by
those exemptions since these areas are predominately served by small
lenders. Both bills contain "safe harbor" amendments to the CRA
which would eliminate public participation in the CRA process for an
estimated 95% of all banks. Both bills would establish a "conclusive"
CRA rating. Comments on a bank's CRA performance would be accepted during the initial stage of CRA examination but, once a rating
is given, no further comments would be accepted. Both bills would
prevent regulators from collecting additional information under CRA.
This would override the new CRA regulation to collect information
on small business lending activity. Finally, the bills provide for raising
the threshold amount for reporting under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMO) from $10 million to $50 million in assets.
Both of the proposed bills would substantially set back the struggle
for fair and equal access to credit for consumers. At the time of this
writing, the House passed its bill, but it appears that the Senate bill
will exclude the anti-CRA provisions. The President has threatened
to veto any bill that weakens the CRA.
3. Federal Fair Lending Litigation.
The United States v. Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n9 2 case was the
first of several cases filed by the Justice Department in recent years
against financial institutions for patterns and practices of credit discrimination. In Decatur, a Justice Department investigation found
that between January 1988 and May 1992, black applicants for loans
were turned down by Decatur Federal at three times the rate of white
applicants. "Even after checking for any differences in income, credit
history, debt levels and any underwriting variables... [the investigators] found race was a major factor in Decatur Federal's loan decisions." 93 The case was resolved by a Consent Decree requiring
Decatur Federal to pay $1 million in damages to forty-eight black applicants identified as victims of discrimination. It also required Decatur Federal to take steps to attract black applicants and to insure
fairness in loan underwriting. Since that time, Decatur has been acquired by Charlotte, North Carolina-based First Union Corporation. 4
Following in the wake of Decatur,the Justice Department launched
a major investigation into the patterns of discrimination against Native Americans at Blackpipe State Bank in South Dakota. The plain92. No. 92-CV-2198 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 1992) (Complaint and Consent Decree).
93. Carolyn Brown, How to Fight Mortgage Discrimination... and Win!!, Black Enterprise,
July 1993, at 50 (quoting James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil
Rights Division of the Justice Department).
94. Id.
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tiffs filed a complaint in November 1993, alleging that the lender
discriminated against Native Americans by refusing to make loans secured by collateral located on reservations and by charging Native
Americans higher interest rates and finance charges than whites.
Under an agreement filed in January 1994, the lender agreed to expand its services to reservations, market its products to Native Americans, reduce interest rates and finance charges on existing
discriminatory loans, and create a $125,000 compensation fund for
past rejected applicants who may be eligible for compensation. 95
The Justice Department then turned its attention to Shawmut Mortgage Company, one of the largest originators of home purchase mortgages in New England.96 Data obtained through the 1991 HMDA
revealed that Shawmut rejected black and Hispanic applicants at twice
the rate of white applicants. Following a one-year investigation by the
Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission, Shawmut
agreed to pay at least $960,000 into a fund to compensate consumers
allegedly
unfairly denied loans on the basis of their race or national
97
origin.

Broadening its approach, the Justice Department initiated its first
lending discrimination suit based entirely on a bank's refusal to market its services in minority neighborhoods. 98 The case against Chevy
Chase Federal Savings Bank and its wholly owned subsidiary, B.F.
Saul Mortgage Company, alleged that Chevy Chase violated the Fair
Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by redlining predominately black populated areas as off-limits for mortgage lending.
The complaint alleged that the bank underwrote approximately 97%
of its loans from 1976 to 1992 in predominately white areas. Under
the settlement terms, Chevy Chase is required to pay $11 million to
the redlined areas through a special loan program and the opening of
bank branches and mortgage offices. Chevy Chase will spend at least
$7 million by offering special home mortgage loans to all residents in
predominately black areas of Washington D.C. and Prince George's
County, Maryland. The bank must make home loan financing available at either 1% less than the prevailing rate to 1/2% below the market rate combined. 99
95. United States v. Blackpipe State Bank, No. 93-5115 (D. S.D. Jan. 21, 1994) (Consent
Decree).
96. United States v. Shawmut Mortgage Co., No. 3:93CV2453 (AVC) (D. Conn. Dec. 13,
1993) (Complaint and Consent Decree) (on file with the author).

97. Ld.
98. United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Sav. Bank, No. 94-1824-JG (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1994)
(Complaint and Consent Decree) (on file with the author).
99. 1d

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol22/iss2/2

24

Harris: Using the Law to Break Discriminatory Barriers to Fair Lending fo

1996]

HOME OWNERSHIP

In other litigation, the Justice Department joined the NAACP in
March 1995 in a discrimination case against American Family Mutual
Insurance Company in Milwaukee. 100 The lender quickly settled.'0 l
IV.

TIHE APPLICANT'S LAWYER'S ROLE.

This section will describe practical strategies attorneys can use in
litigation when representing individuals victimized by discriminatory
practices by banks and thrift institutions.
HYPOTHETICAL - Jane Perkins is an African-American female
who moved to Raleigh, North Carolina, from Atlanta, Georgia. She is
a computer engineer with IBM with an annual salary of $100,000 after
taxes. Jane is divorced and she and her nine year-old daughter live in
an apartment. Jane receives $10,000 per year in alimony payments
from her ex-husband. She recently sold her home in Atlanta and now
desires to buy a house in the Woodcroft subdivision of Durham, an
area that is ninety-eight percent white. The sales price of the house is
$100,000. Jane has enough money to make a twenty percent downpayment and to pay closing costs.
Jane enters the Woodcroft office of the Neighborhood Bank to apply for a mortgage loan. When she first enters the bank, Jane notices a
poster that states, "We gladly make home loans to up and coming families." The picture on the poster is that of a man, woman, and two
children - all are white. When Jane requests a loan application, the
loan officer acts rudely towards her and suggests that it would be futile
for her to seek a mortgage loan. After insisting, Jane is given a home
loan application. Two months after submitting the application, Jane
receives a telephone call from the loan officer indicating that her
home mortgage loan application was denied. The loan officer tells her
that her loan application was denied because she lacked sufficient income and down payment and lacked a satisfactory credit history. The
bank refused to consider Jane's alimony payments inits calculations of
her income. Further, the loan officer indicates that the bank does not
make mortgage loans for less than $150,000 and that bank policy requires applicants to have enough money to pay thirty percent as
downpayment, plus closing costs.

A. Scope of the ECOA and the FHA
Jane's problem clearly falls within the scope of the ECOA. She is
an "applicant ' '1 °0 and Neighborhood Bank is a "creditor," as defined
100. The New Redlining,supra note 6, at 51.
101. United States v. American Family Mutual Insurance, No. 95-C-327 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 30,
1995) (Consent Decree); NAACP v. American Family Mutual Insurance, No. 90-C-0759 (E.D.
Wis. Mar. 30, 1995) (Consent Decree).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (1995).
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by ECOA. 10 3 Jane is seeking "credit" as defined by ECOA,1°4 and she
is a member of a class of persons the ECOA was created to protect. 0 5
Similarly, the FHA applies. Jane is a member of the protected
class, 10 6 and the loan sought is to purchase a house. Since the credit
provisions of the FHA c6ver all mortgage and home improvement
loans and all housing lenders, 0 7 the FHA governs the actions of
Neighborhood Bank.
B.

Private Right of Action

Under the ECOA, Jane has a right to file a lawsuit in federal or
state court against Neighborhood Bank for credit discrimination. The
ECOA grants a private right of action against a discriminating creditor to any individual or class of individuals.0 8 If it appears that she is
not the only black and/or female potential homeowner who was denied a loan under Neighborhood Bank's policy, a class action may be
possible. 0 9
Jane has the same right to sue under the FHA. She is an aggrieved
person," 0 and as such has the right to commence a civil action in federal district court or state court."'
C. Proof of Discrimination
There are three recognized methods of proving discrimination
under the ECOA and the FHA:
(1) 'overt evidence of discrimination,' when a lender blatantly discriminates on a prohibited basis;
(2) evidence of 'disparate treatment,' when a lender treats applicants
differently based on one of the prohibited factors; and
(3) evidence of 'disparate impact,' when a lender applies a practice
uniformly to all applicants but the practice has a discriminatory
effect on a2 prohibited basis and is not justified by business
necessity."
103. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(I) (1995).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(d) (1995).

105. Id. at § 1691(a).
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3605 (1995).
107. Id. at § 3605(a), (b).

108. "Any creditor who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under... [the ECOA]
... shall be liable to the aggrieved applicant for any actual damages sustained by such applicant
acting either in an individual capacity or as a member of a class." 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a) (1988).
109. Id.
110. "An 'aggrieved person' includes any person who - (1) claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (1988).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a).
112. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, supra note 69, reprintedin FRRS 6153.13.
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All three methods of proof can be used in the hypothetical above.
The rude behavior of, and statements made by, the loan officer are
evidence of overt discrimination, as the acts were intended to discourage Jane from applying for a loan in the first place.'1 3 The FHA specifically prohibits the use of actions that interfere with, or discourage a
person from, applying for a housing loan. The poster specifically violates the FHA by creating and exploiting a racially exclusive image,
suggesting that only white applicants are sought.1 4 The bank's refusal
to consider Jane's alimony payments in its calculations of her "income" is also a violation." 5 Given the broad coverage of the ECOA,
the FHA violations also would be considered evidence of ECOA
violations.
Assume that the average loan determination time for Neighborhood Bank is three days. For the bank to take two months to process
Jane's application is discriminatory disparate treatment. Regulation B
of the ECOA defines discrimination against an applicant to mean "to
treat an applicant less favorably than other applicants.""16 The loan
officer told Jane that her loan application was denied because she
lacked both sufficient income and a satisfactory credit history. By
showing that the bank has approved applicants with similar income
and expense conditions as Jane or with similar credit histories, she can
prove discrimination by disparate treatment.
Other examples of disparate treatment violative of the ECOA and
the FRA include requiring an application fee of minority applicants
but not of nonminority applicants; assisting nonminority applicants in
"clearing up" problems on their credit histories but not assisting minority applicants; and giving nonminority applicants assistance in
fill17
ing out loan applications but not assisting minority applicants.
Assuming that there are a couple of bad entries on her credit history, Jane may still show disparate treatment by the bank. If, by a
comparison of the applications of denied minorities and approved
whites, Jane can prove that Neighborhood Bank approved loan applications of white applicants with credit histories similar to Jane's, she
can show a violation of the ECOA and the FHA by disparate treatment. Additionally, if she can show that the bank assisted white applicants with similar credit histories in clearing up their credit problems,
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1988); FRRS 6-1481; 6-1488.
114. FRRS 6-1486 (citing United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D.
Miss. 1982)).
115. FRRS 6-1493.
116. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(n) (1995). See also Sayers v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 522
F. Supp. 835 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980);
Vander Missen v. Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank, 481 F. Supp. 742 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
117. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, supra note 69, reprinted in FRRS 6153.15.
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while not assisting her, she can show ECOA and FHA violations by
disparate treatment.
The Federal Reserve describes the analysis for finding liability for
disparate treatment as similar to the analysis used in Title VII cases:
If a lender has apparently treated similar applicants differently on
the basis of a prohibited factor, it must provide an explanation for the

difference in treatment. If the lender is unable to provide a credible
and legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation, the agency may infer
that the lender discriminated.
If the agency determines that a lender's explanation for treating
some applicants differently is a pretext for discrimination, the agency
may find that the lender discriminated, notwithstanding the lender's
explanation .... When a lender's treatment of two applicants is compared, even when there is an apparently valid explanation for a particular difference in treatment, further investigation may establish
disparate treatment on a prohibited basis. For example, seemingly
valid explanations for denying loans to minority applicants may have
been applied consistently to minority applicants and inconsistently to
nonminority applicants ....
A pattern or practice of disparate treatment on a prohibited basis
may also be established through a valid statistical analysis of detailed
loan-file information, provided that the analysis controls for possible
legitimate explanations for differences in treatment. Where a lender's
underwriting decisions are the subject of a statistical analysis, detailed
information must be collected from individual loan files about the applicants' qualifications for credit. Data reported by lenders under the
HMDA do not, standing alone, provide sufficient information for such
an analysis because they omit important variables, such as credit histories and debt ratios. HMDA data are useful, though, for identifying
lenders whose practices may warrant investigation for compliance
with fair lending laws. HMvDA data may also be relevant, in conjunction with other evidence, to the determination [of] whether a lender
has discriminated."'
Statistical data to prove disparate treatment can be obtained
through discovery and possibly by examination of the HMDA data for
Neighborhood Bank for Durham. Since Jane is also female and a single mother, a comparison with similarly situated females, married individuals, white males, or whites in general may be appropriate.
Where examination and analysis of the HMDA data are necessary,
there are organizations and statisticians who can assist the attorney in
collecting and analyzing the HMDA data."-9
118. I&
119. One such individual is Peter Skillern, Executive Director of the Durham Affordable
Housing Coalition ((919) 683-1185).
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Bank policies which forbid making mortgage loans for less than
$150,000 and which require applicants to have enough money to pay
thirty percent as a downpayment, plus closing costs, are evidence of
disparate impact. "When a lender applies a policy or practice equally
to credit applicants, but the policy or practice has a disproportionate
adverse impact on applicants from a group protected against discrimination, the policy or practice is described as having a 'disparate impact."' 20 Under the "disparate impact" or "effects" test, the creditor
will be liable if its actions have the effect of denying credit to applicants belonging to one of the protected categories in a pattern significantly different from that of the general pool of applicants. 1 '
Congressional reports accompanying the 1976 amendments to the
ECOA show an intent to apply an effects test to prove discrimination.
Senate Report No. 94-589 accompanying H.R. 6516, in the section entitled Categories of Prohibited Discrimination, stated as follows:
The prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin are unqualified ....In determining the existence of discrimination on these grounds, as well as on the other
grounds discussed below, courts or agencies are free to look at the
effects of a creditor's practices as well as the creditor's motives or conduct in the individual transactions. Thus, judicial constructions of
anti-discrimination legislation in the employment field, in cases such
as Griggs v. Duke Power Company, [401 U.S. 424 (1971)], and Albemarle PaperCompany v. Moody, [422 U.S. 405 (1975)], are intended
to serve as guides in the application of this Act,
2 especially with respect
to the allocations of the burdens of proof.1
Regulation B notes "[t]he legislative history of [ECOA] indicates that
the Congress intended an 'effects test' concept, as outlined in the employment field by the Supreme Court in the cases of Griggs... and
Albemarle . . . to be applicable to a creditor's determination of
creditworthiness."'2
Using the disparate impact analysis, Jane has the initial burden of
showing that the lender's credit amount or downpayment policies,
although neutral or nondiscriminatory on their face, have a disparate
adverse impact on persons protected under one of the nine prohibited
bases enumerated in the ECOA. "Not every member of the group
must be adversely affected for the practice to have a disparate im120. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, supra note 69, reprinted in FRRS 6153.16.
121. See, eg., Sayers, 522 F. Supp. at 839; Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending,
supra note 69, reprintedin FRRS 6-153.16.
122. S.Rep. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4-5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.CC.A.N. 403,
406.
123. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a), n2 (1994).
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pact."'" Examination of applicants' files will probably show that persons of color and women are more adversely affected by these rules
than the general pool of applicants. Having made that showing, the
burden then shifts to the lender to establish that its policies further a
legitimate business objective. If the lender is unable to make this
showing, the policies violate the ECOA. If, on the other hand, the
bank can demonstrate a legitimate business objective, the burden then
shifts back to Jane. She must then show that there is a less discriminatory or nondiscriminatory alternative that also furthers the lender's
legitimate business objective.
In Sayers v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., the plaintiff sued
GMAC for refusing to grant credit privileges because of poor credit
history. 12 5 Plaintiff met her initial burden of proof by using a disparate impact analysis. She introduced into evidence credit files of approximately twenty-five males to whom GMAC had extended credit
although they, like plaintiff, had delinquent credit obligations 26 With
the plaintiff meeting her prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifted to GMAC to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for not approving plaintiff's application. 27 The court held that
GMAC met its burden by showing there were extenuating circumstances with regard to the male applicants that were not present in
plaintiff's case: each of the twenty-five male
applicants had prior deal2
ings with GMAC and plaintiff did not. 3
Under the disparate impact test, the creditor cannot defend his or
her actions on the grounds that he or she did not directly and intentionally discriminate on a prohibited basis. Evidence of discriminatory intent is not necessary to establish that a policy or practice
adopted or implemented by a lender which has a disparate impact is in
violation of the ECOA and the FHA. 129
D. Use of Testers
If the bank's discriminatory practices against Jane are part of a
widespread pattern or practice of discrimination, it may be necessary
to seek broader relief that will benefit the greater community rather
than just Jane. A class action is one method of accomplishing this
goal. The use of testers is another method.
124.
153.16.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
153.16.

Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, supra note 66, reprinted in FRRS 6522 F. Supp. 835, 839 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
Id. at 839-40.
Id. at 840.
Id.
Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, supra note 69, reprinted in FRRS 6-
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"Testers" are defined as individuals who, for the sole purpose of
uncovering unlawful discriminatory hiring, housing, or credit practices, apply for employment, housing, or credit that they do not intend
to accept. 130 In the housing context, testers are defined as "individuals who, with no intent to rent or purchase a home or apartment, pose
as renters or purchasers for the purpose of collecting evidence of unlawful steering practices." 3 '
Testers themselves have broad standing to sue for discrimination in
a variety of areas, including employment and housing. Even though
the person may not intend to accept the job, or rent or purchase the
home, the fact that he or she was denied the job, housing, or credit
makes the person an "aggrieved person" entitled to sue the discriminating party under applicable law.'32 Standing is interpreted broadly
under Title VII in order to achieve the statute's objective of equal
employment opportunity, especially since Title VII is generally enforced by private lawsuits. 33 All that is required is that the complainant be "aggrieved" by the illegal employment practice.' 34
It is well established that testers have standing to sue under the Fair
Housing Act. 35 Standing to sue under the FHA, as with other civil
rights statutes, is broadly construed since testers "act not only on their
own behalf but also 'as private attorneys general in vindicating
a pol'136
icy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority."
Under the ECOA, a private right of action is granted to an aggrieved applicant. 37 A tester can be an aggrieved applicant under the
ECOA, even though the tester may have no real intention of borrowing the money. Given that the purpose of testers is to further the
congressional and constitutionally mandated policies against discrimination and that testers have standing to sue under virtually all civil
rights statutes, including Title VII and the FHA, it is only logical that
courts will allow testers standing to sue to eliminate credit discrimination practices prohibited by the ECOA.
130. M. Fix & R. Struck (Eds.) Clearand Convincing Evidence" Testingfor Discriminationin
America, 8 (1992) [hereinafter Applying Testing in Employment Discrimination]. Presented to
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund Lawyers Training Institute on Oct. 10,1992 (Fair Employment
Council of Greater Washington, Inc.).
131. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982).
132. Id. at 374.
133. Applying Testing in Employment Discrimination, supra note 126.
134. "Section 706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), authorizes [EEOC] to accept charges
of employment discrimination 'filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved.'"
Applying Testing in Employment Discrimination, supra note 126.
135. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
136. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,211 (1972) (referring to the Fair
Housing Act).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a) (1988).
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In fact, to help eliminate discrimination in the industry, the Mortgage Bankers Association is now urging mortgage bankers to 13begin
8
using testers to uncover discrimination within their own ranks.
Generally, testers are sent in pairs at different times. They have the
same qualifications and go to the same real estate agent or banker to
determine bias. The testers' characteristics are identical except for
race, gender, or other characteristics that would form the basis of illegal discrimination. There are numerous papers on the subject of using
testers139 and there are organizations that can assist attorneys in developing a good testing program. 14° This author recommends these
resources to attorneys representing either applicants or banks.
E. Remedies Under the ECOA and the FHA
A creditor is not liable for an ECOA violation for actions undertaken in good faith, defined as honesty in fact, and in conformity with
Regulation B or official interpretations of the law. 4 ' A creditor may
also avoid liability for violations of certain provisions if the actions
were the result of inadvertent error. 142 Inadvertent error is defined as
a "mechanical, electronic, or clerical error that a creditor demonstrates was not intentional and occurred notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such errors. ' 1' 4 3 The
provisions subject to an inadvertent error defense include provisions
relating to the consideration of credit history, notification requirements, credit history reporting on joint accounts, record
retention re44
quirements, and federal monitoring requirements.
Pursuant to the ECOA, the prevailing applicant may recover actual
damages in an unlimited amOunt.ins Actual damages can include outof-pocket expenses, such as the difference in interest paid, and intangible damages, such as humiliation and mental distress, injury to the
138. Paulette Thomas, Banks are Urgedto Use "Testers" to Root Out Bias, WALL ST. J., Sept.
14, 1992, at 73.
139. See, e.g., Marc Bendick, Jr. et al., Measuring Employment Discrimination Through Controlled Experiments, (unpublished paper presented to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund Lawyers
Training Institute (Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc., Jan. 1993); George
Glaster, The Use of Testers in Investigating Mortgage Lending and Insurance Discrimination,
(Sept. 26, 1991) (research paper presented at the Conference on "Testing for Discrimination in
America: Results and Policy Implications," sponsored by The Rockefeller Foundation and the

Urban Institute).
140. Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. ((202) 842-4474); Fair Housing

Council
141.
I(1).
142.
143.

Of Greater Washington ((202) 289-5360).
12 C.F.R. § 202.2(r) (1994). See Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. Pt. 202, Supp.
12 C.F.R. § 202.2(s) (1994).
Id.

144. Id. at §§ 202.6(b), 202.9, 202.10, 202.12, 202.13.

145. 15 U.S.C § 1691e(a) (1988).
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applicant's reputation for creditworthiness, and loss of increased
purchasing power."4 The Supreme Court has upheld the award of
actual damages based on emotional distress with proof of injury. 147
Actual damages need not be proven inorder for a plaintiff to seek
other remedies, such as punitive damages, equitable and declaratory
except
relief, and attorneys' fees."4 Punitive damages are recoverable149
against a government or governmental subdivision or agency.
The ECOA also provides that plaintiffs may obtain "such equitable
and declaratory relief as is necessary to enforce the requirements
imposed under this subchapter."'5 0 This remedy is particularly important if there is a class of individuals who are victims of discrimination.151 Such remedies may include an injunction prohibiting future
illegal conduct and prohibiting the bank from collecting on obligations
incurred in violation of the ECOA, as well as other broad remedies.
Attorneys' fees and costs will be awarded to the applicant's counsel
if the court awards damages, punitive damages, or equitable or declaratory relief. 5 2 One court held that the denial of a creditor's motion
for summary judgment in an ECOA action was insufficient to warrant
an interim award of attorneys' fees. 5 3 In an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, the Supreme Court ruled that prevailing civil rights litigants
are entitled to attorneys' fees regardless of whether they are represented by private or nonprofit counsel. 5 4
The FHA authorizes the award of actual and punitive damages,'
as well as equitable relief.156 Attorneys' fees and costs are available to
the prevailing party, unless the prevailing party is the government;
however,
the government can be held liable for attorneys' fees and
15 7
costs.

F. Statute of Limitations Under the ECOA and the FHA
The statute of limitations to sue under the ECOA and FHA is two
years from the occurrence of the violation.' A violation can occur at
146. See Owens v. Magee Fin. Serv. of Bogalusa, 476 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. La. 1979); Schuman
v. Standard Oil Co., 453 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
147. See Carey v. Pipus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b)-(d) (1988). See also Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026
(N.D. Ga. 1980).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1988).
150. Id. at § 1691e(c).
151. Id. at § 1691e(b).
152. Id. at § 1691e(d).
153. Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
154. Blum, Comm'r, N.Y. State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (1988).
156. Id
157. Id-at § 3613(c)(2).
158. Id. at § 3613(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f) (1988).
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any time during the credit transaction, including during collection procedures. Therefore, an individual can bring an action many years after the initial loan application. However, the claim for relief does not
relate back to the original application - the action must be filed
within two years of the discriminatory act complained of in the complaint. The ECOA two-year limitation is not applicable when a federal administrative agency with ECOA enforcement authority or the
United States Attorney General has begun its own ECOA action
within two years from the date of the occurrence of the action. 5 9
In many cases, a client may seek legal counsel after the two-year
statute of limitations has expired. There are still options available,
such as waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. 16 0 Also, the attorney
should research whether the continuing violation theory, as used in
Title VII cases, can be used under the ECOA or the FHA to cover
acts committed
more than two years before the date the plaintiff files
6
the action.' '
Four reported cases have addressed the issue of whether a person
being sued on a debt after the statute of limitations has run has the
remedy of raising ECOA violations in the form of recoupment (to
reduce the applicant's liability to the bank) or a counterclaim. Three
courts have held that the defendant was permitted to maintain a defense of recoupment even though the statute of limitations provisions
in ECOA normally would bar an action for damages. 62 In Marine
American State Bank v. Lincoln, attorneys' fees and punitive damages
were awarded on a recoupment claim. 63 In another case, a court refused to consider an ECOA defense, finding that the counterclaim was
barred by the statute of limitations. 1'
G.

Use of the CRA

The CRA is grossly underutilized as a strategy to attack credit discrimination. In 1992, there were 5,258 applications by banks and
thrifts for approval of mergers, acquisitions, or opening new
branches. 65 Of this number, there were only forty-six challenges
based on inadequate compliance with the CRA. 6 6 Only three of the
forty-six challenges resulted in the denial of an application. 67
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f)(2) (1988).
160. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1981).
161.

No cases were discovered exploring this theory.

162. See FDIC v. Notis, 602 A.2d 1164 (Me. 1992); Marine Am. State Bank v. Lincoln, 433
N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1988); In re Remington, 19 B.R. 718 (D. Colo. 1982).
163. 433 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1988).

164.
165.
166.
167.

Ford City Bank v. Goldman, 424 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
CRA Objections Blocked 3 Filings in '92, BANiNo WY_ 10 (Mar. 29, 1993).
Id.
Id.
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It is important that attorneys representing consumer groups learn to
utilize the CRA as strong leverage to "convince" institutions to work
with community development organizations and other groups doing
economic development work. A properly negotiated CRA agreement
can be of great help to the community and the bank.
HMDA data provide a means to determine noncompliance with the
CRA. By drawing on HMDA data, attorneys can easily point out to
financial institutions the need to change their discriminatory practices
which could lead to penalties, This would allow the attorney negotiating power to work out deals to help community development organizations and minority borrowers in general.
V.

BANKS' ATToRNEys' STRATEGmS.

Attorneys who represent lenders are in a unique position to help
both their clients and consumers by assisting the clients in compliance
with the fair lending laws.
The attorney should recommend that the lender perform a self-assessment, focusing on compliance with all of the fair lending laws and
regulations. Corrective action should be taken where violations or
other problems are detected. It may be necessary to modify internal
policies as a result of compliance problems detected. In any event,
every lender should have a monitoring system in place to regularly
and periodically evaluate the lender's compliance with fair lending
laws.
A second review program may be helpful if the lender's denial rates
show disparate trends based on race. The second review program
should focus on missed opportunities instead of whether the decision
to deny the loan request is properly or adequately documented.
The development and implementation of checklists, to be used in
conjunction with all loan applications, should be considered. The
checklists should address the various elements of the fair lending laws
as well as the issue of assistance to marginal applicants.
All of the lender's staff should receive training, on an ongoing basis,
on fair lending laws. The comprehensives of that training should vary
depending on the functions or responsibilities of the individual employees. Since employees at all levels can commit fair lending violations, all employees, regardless of their position, need this training.
Finally, all of the lender's policies should be run through an effects
test model to ensure that none of its policies inadvertently violate the
fair lending laws.
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CONCLUSION.

It is only through vigilant enforcement of fair housing and fair lending laws that all individuals and communities will have fair access to
the financing needed to improve their lives. This fair access benefits
the consumers as well as the lending institutions themselves. "[B]anks
may take some comfort from the fact that sincere efforts to eliminate
bias are the right thing to do. Further,
done properly, they may well
168
prove to be good for business.'

168. William Streeter, Toward Bias-Free Banking, A.B.A.
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